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Abstract— This paper introduces Policy based Management 
Information Base to mange danger in Artificial Immune System 
inspired secure routing in Wireless Mesh Networks. WMN 
management functions are defined and the paper focuses only 
on the security function. Proposed policy based management 
and typical operation of the architecture are also reported. 
 
 
Index Terms— Artificial Immune System (AIS), Management 
Information Base (MIB), Wireless Mesh Networks (WMNs) 
 
I. INTRODUCTION TO WIRELESS MESH NETWORKS (WMNS) 
Wireless Mesh Networks (WMNs) have recently gained 
mounting curiosity and have emerged as a promising 
technology with great budding for a large array of 
applications such as real time transportation systems, disaster 
networking, rural networks, health and medical systems, 
building automation and security surveillance systems. 
WMNs are self organizing and self configuring wireless 
networks implemented with IEEE 802.11 hardware. The 
value of a network is perceived by the services it provides to 
its users. Unfortunately, security is often a secondary 
consideration and some what contradictory to usability. 
Consequently, many networks are inadequately safeguarded 
against a variety of attacks. Wireless networks are more 
vulnerable than wired networks because the wireless medium 
is shared and accessible through the air. Unfortunately, 
WMNs presents additional security challenges due to their 
decentralized nature, dynamic network topology and easy 
access to the radio medium. Hence security is an important 
consideration for the practical operation of WMNs. Inside 
security, secure routing is imperative and the problem of 
routing in WMNs is to be urgently investigated in order for 
the successful deployment of these networks. 
II. ARCHITECTURE OF WMN 
According to the 802.11s standard, nodes in a mesh 
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network fall into 4 categories; Client or Station (STA) is a 
node that requests services but does not forward frames, nor 
participate in path discovery, Mesh Point (MP) is a node that 
participates in the formation operations of the mesh, Mesh 
Access Point (MAP) is a MP attached to an access point (AP) 
to provide services for clients (STA) and Mesh Portal Point 
(MPP) is a MP with additional functionality to act as a 
gateway between the mesh and an external network like the 
Internet. Fig.1 shows the architecture according to 802.11s 
standard. 
 
Figure1: WMN Architecture 
 
III. SECURE ROUTING IN WMNS 
In our previous work [1], we proposed Human Immune 
System (HIS) concept, subsequently Artificial Immune 
System (AIS) Models to embed in secure routing in WMNs. 
The selected AIS model among other models in the literature 
is the “Danger Model”. In order to apply HIS concepts in 
WMNs, we have mapped HIS elements with WMN 
components. The table below shows the mapping between 
HIS and WMN [1]. 
 
TABLE I: MAPPING HIS WITH WMN 
 
HIS WMN 
Body The entire WMN 
Self-Cells Well behaved network resource nodes 
Non-Self 
Cells 
Corrupted or well-behaving but 
unauthorized nodes inside the network or 
any external input either friendly or 
malicious 
Antigen Possible cause of interruption or danger to 
the network 
Antibody Recovery or protection actions for the node 
in danger against antigen 
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The process of modeling WMN security based on danger 
theory consists of two steps [1]. The first step is to recognize 
the danger signal and the second step is to classify danger 
signals into different levels. Danger signals can therefore be 
issued by the network cells (nodes). The danger signals 
signify the state of the mesh network. Some examples of 
danger signals are the number of error messages generated 
per second by a broken link of the network, the number of 
transmitted packets per second, congestion over a threshold, 
inappropriate disk activity, node failure, noise and viruses. In 
order to realize the first step, we need to find a mechanism to 
store the state information of the network elements. In this 
paper we propose a method to store node state information in 
the network. In our proposal, we basically introduce object 
oriented approach. The WMN entities are treated as objects 
and each object has a unique ID, attributes and behaviors. 
IV. WIRELESS MESH NETWORK MANAGEMENT FUNCTIONS 
In this section we define five major management functions 
and concentrate on security management, specifically AIS 
embedded secure routing. 
 
 
Figure2: WMN Management functions 
The Configuration Management records and maintains 
network configuration, parameter updating for ensuring 
correct network operation; Performance Management 
includes performance measurement of hardware and 
software. For example, how long a request takes to give a 
response? How many responses are given to a request?; 
Accounting Management handles network users. For 
instance, how many times a user logs into the system? Or 
how many requests are done each time; Fault Management 
finds problems or errors from network. This is used to know 
if a network component was running or not and Security 
Management is responsible for controlling the process of 
information access in the network, providing protection for 
network resources, services and data to avoid danger. During 
this process the system may check if a user can log in the 
system or not. 
V. MANAGEMENT INFORMATION BASE (MIB)  
A MIB is a tree data structure, where the leaves are 
individual items of data called objects or variables. A MIB 
object may be, for example, a counter or a protocol status. 
These managed objects allow remote monitoring and control 
of systems over a network. The frequent incorrect way to 
visualize a MIB is as a database on a managed system. It is 
more correct to view a MIB as definitions of the information 
that can be accessed and the events that can be reported by 
standard protocols. Standard operations are requested or 
performed on a system via a management agent by 
management clients. It is the responsibility of the 
management agent to access the requested information and 
return it to the requesting client. Some example values for 
MIB object are [3] Object type which identifies the type of 
MIB object, Syntax which identifies the data type which 
models the object, Access which identifies the maximum 
level of access, Status which specifies the status of a 
managed object and a description which provides a textual 
description of the managed object. In wireless networks 
SNMP MIBs are used to manage hardware. 
The SNMP MIB is conceptually a tree structure with 
conceptual tables containing information such as 
transmission medium or routing protocols. MIBs may be 
standard or enterprise. Internet standard MIBs are defined by 
working groups of the Internet Engineering Task Force 
(IETF) and published as Requests for Comment (RFCs). 
Enterprise MIBs are defined by other organizations, usually 
individual companies.  
The definition of managed objects may progress 
independent of the protocols used to operate on the MIB and 
the MIBs can be reformatted accordingly. However, 
operations may be generalized into three categories: 
information retrieval, information modification, and 
unsolicited information reporting.  
VI. POLICY BASED MIB 
The increasing complexity and heterogeneity of WMN 
initiates major challenge to network management. Thus, 
good management policies are critical for successful 
operation of WMN. Policy based management supports the 
network and service administrators by (a) using a high degree 
of viewpoints of quality and (b) providing a variety of the 
services while decreasing the cost of running the services [2]. 
It is an appropriate means to automate many of the 
management functions. In policy based management 
systems, since the policies defined by the administrators do 
not directly translate into device configurations, the system 
uses the current network state and configuration to determine 
a set of configurations that enforce these policies [2].  
We propose the following four issues to sense in order to 
ensure the successful deployment of policy-based 
management in WMN: 
 
• What kind of management knowledge is needed 
to uphold the formation of the policy?  
• How to choose the apposite network states which 
form the management knowledge  
• How to apply the composed knowledge for a safe 
policy application 
• How can the policies specified be imposed 
efficiently? i.e. the requested network service 
should be offered without adversely affecting 
other services and the quality of the requested 
services  
VII. PROPOSED ARCHITECTURE OF THE POLICY BASED 
MANAGEMENT SYSTEM 
The proposed architecture consists of three major 
components, policy based MIB (PMIB), Policy Management 
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System (PMS) and the complete WMN. Policy Storage (PS), 
Network state information (NS) and Action formation Unit 
(AU) shape the PMIB; Monitoring Unit (MU), Policy 
forming Unit (PU) and predefined algorithm (AL) form 
PMS; and WMN consists of all elements defined in section 
II. The figure below shows the proposed architecture. 
 
 
Figure3: PMIB Architecture 
 
• Monitoring Unit (MU): Monitors and receive 
network state information 
• Policy forming Unit (PU): Compose policies 
• Predefined algorithm (AL): Assists in forming 
policies 
• Policy Storage (PS): Accumulate composed 
policies 
• Network state information (NS): Provide network 
state information in timely manner 
• Action formation Unit (AU): Initiate network 
actions according to the policies  
VIII. BASIC OPERATION OF THE ARCHITECTURE 
Based on the received network state information, policies are 
produced. Then policy check request is initiated and sent to 
PMIB. Based on the decision, action to perform is sent to 
PMS. Then PMS instruct WMN accordingly. 
IX. TYPICAL OPERATION OF THE PROPOSED POLICY BASED 
MANAGEMENT 
The operation runs on the following algorithm 
Start 
Receive state information of the network devices 
 
Form policy / policies according to a predefined 
algorithm 
 
Accumulate formed policy / policies into the Policy 
Management System (PMS) 
 
Policy management system queries the policy based 
MIB automatically  
 
Check composed policy (policies) is not creating 
unreachable or conflict policies 
 
If reachable and not conflicting 
 
PMS convert new configuration into realizable 
policies  
 
Save updated / new policy in policy based MIB 
(PMIB) 
 
Send policies/policy to relevant devices 
 
Activate network accordingly 
 
 Else 
Record the state information for future 
prediction 
 
 Endif 
 
When policy requested by the network 
device / devices 
 
    Network device initiate request to PMS 
 
    PMS process the request 
 
Send appropriate signals to network 
elements 
 
    Network reacts accordingly    
 
    End 
 
X. FUTURE WORK 
We are scheduling to improve proposed policy based 
management algorithm in our next paper and implement our 
novel idea in real world applications. Also we will focus on 
the second step in the process of modeling WMN security 
based on danger theory introduced in our previous paper [1]. 
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